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Contract Pricing in Consumer Credit Markets
Abstract
We analyze subprime consumer lending and the role played by down payment requirements in screening
high-risk borrowers and limiting defaults. To do this, we develop an empirical model of the demand for
financed purchases that incorporates both adverse selection and repayment incentives. We estimate the model
using detailed transaction-level data on subprime auto loans. We show how different elements of loan
contracts affect the quality of the borrower pool and subsequent loan performance. We also evaluate the
returns to credit scoring that allows sellers to customize financing terms to individual applicants. Our
approach shows how standard econometric tools for analyzing demand and supply under imperfect
competition extend to settings in which firms care about the identity of their customers and their
postpurchase behavior.
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Abstract. We study pricing and contract design in the subprime auto sales market. We
develop a model of the demand for nanced purchases that incorporates both adverse
selection and moral hazard e¤ects, and estimate the model using detailed transaction-
level data. We use the model to quantify selection and repayment problems and show
that di¤erent contracting terms, in particular car price and required down payment,
resolve very di¤erent pricing trade-o¤s. We also evaluate the returns to credit scoring
that allows sellers to customize nancing terms to individual applicants. Our empirical
approach shows how standard tools for analyzing demand and supply in traditional
product markets extend to contract markets where agreement and performance are
separated in time, so rms care about both the quantity and quality of demand.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the industrial organization of credit and insurance markets has been of central
importance to policy-makers and practitioners. Yet compared to the rapid advance of empirical
methods for studying demand and pricing in product markets, the analysis of these contract markets
has lagged behind. A primary reason for this has been the perceived di¢ culty of estimating demand
and supply behavior in markets with adverse selection and/or moral hazard. In this paper, we
illustrate how one can adapt standard empirical tools for demand and pricing analysis to contract
markets that are characterized by both incentive and informational problems. We apply these
methods to study the market for subprime auto loans.
Our development builds on models of insurance demand formulated by Cardon and Hendel
(2001) and Cohen and Einav (2007).1 In a similar spirit to those papers, we build a demand sys-
tem for loan contracts in which choice behavior and transaction outcomes arise from a combination
of consumer and contract characteristics. We then go a step further by marrying the demand sys-
tem to supply-side decisions about contract design. This requires us to tackle several complications
relative to a standard product market analysis. In credit markets, rms care about the identity of
their customers as well as the quantity of sales. In addition, contract terms may a¤ect transaction
outcomes; for instance, charging a higher interest rate may increase the likelihood of default. Also,
contracts may have several dimensions that are easy to adjust, undermining the usual assumption
that non-price product characteristics are xed, at least in the short run. Despite these complica-
tions, we provide a relatively simple framework that permits analysis of cost conditions and optimal
contract design.2
While one of our goals is to illustrate a general approach to studying contract markets, our
focus is on the specic market for used auto sales and subprime loans.3 Here we make use of
extraordinarily rich transaction-level data from a large auto sales company. The company specializes
in selling to consumers with low incomes or poor credit histories  the so-called subprimemarket.
This market is attractive for studying pricing and contract design in the presence of informational
1See also Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf (2007) for a related application to annuity demand, and Chiappori and
Salanie (2000) and Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) as representative of a closely-related literature on testing for
asymmetric information.
2Some of the issues that arise here are conceptually similar to those in Wolak (1994) and Perrigne and Vuong
(2006), who focus on the behavior of a regulated utility.
3For additional work on informational problems in consumer lending, see Ausubel (1991, 1999), Edelberg (2004,
2006), and Karlan and Zinman (2007a, 2007b).
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problems. There is substantial borrower heterogeneity and default risk, so the ability to originate
protable loans depends crucially on designing o¤ers that attract lower risk borrowers and that
facilitate repayment. In addition, the availability of credit bureau information allows rms to base
nancing options on customer risk proles and allows us to study the value of risk-based nancing.
Finally, o¤ers to customers can vary on multiple dimensions: car price, required down payment,
interest rate and loan length, so we can investigate the screening and incentive roles played by
di¤erent contract parameters.
We use a model of subprime auto transactions to quantify the trade-o¤s involved in contract
design. In earlier work (Adams, Einav and Levin, 2007), we found evidence that subprime lenders
face both repayment problems (with larger loans less likely to be repaid) and selection problems
(substantial observed and unobserved borrower heterogeneity). We take the descriptive ndings
reported in that paper as a guide in formulating the present model. The advantage of the current
approach is that it unies the insights from the earlier paper in a single empirical model, and
allows us to quantify in dollar terms the importance of incentive and selection e¤ects, the value
of information about consumers, the ability to vary prices over time, and possible departures from
optimal pricing.
The demand system we develop captures a customers decision of whether to purchase a car and
how to nance the transaction jointly with the loan repayment process. In a nutshell, the model
consists of four equations that link individual customer, car and nancing characteristics to (i) a
purchase decision, (ii) a nancing decision, (iii) a repayment history, and (iv) a recovery in the
event of default. The demand equations are linked structurally, so an individuals nancing decision
a¤ects loan size, which in turn a¤ects repayment. The model also permits individual customer and
contract characteristics to a¤ect each decision, so customers with a higher credit score may be
less likely to default but also less inclined to take the largest possible loan. Importantly we allow
consumer decisions to be correlated conditional on observables, so we account for the possibility
that buyers who are inclined to borrow more for unobservable reasons are also more likely to default.
Our demand estimates reect the importance of consumer liquidity, and highlight the signif-
icance of both moral hazard and adverse selection. Consistent with the results of Adams, Einav
and Levin (2007), we nd that purchasing decisions are highly sensitive to minimum down pay-
ment requirements and substantially less sensitive to car prices. Changes in car prices appear to
translate primarily into larger loans. We also nd a strong correlation between consumer liquidity
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and subsequent default. An implication is that marginalbuyers, who are just able to meet the
required down payment, represent much worse risks than average buyers; roughly 60 percent of
buyers default on their loans, but marginal buyers default at an even greater rate of 69 percent.
Finally, default rates are quite sensitive to loan size: a $1,000 larger loan increases the probability
of default by 5 percent.
The estimated demand model provides a building block to study pricing and contract design.
We use relatively weak assumptions about optimality, combined with observed pricing decisions, to
estimate the rms indirect or shadow cost of capital adjustment. Because we start with excellent
data on observed costs, we are able to explore the implications of di¤erent notions of pricing
optimality, and also assess the protability of alternative pricing policies.
The main idea we explore with the pricing model is that changes in o¤ered terms have very
di¤erent e¤ects on the composition of purchasers and their borrowing and repayment behavior. We
focus on two particular dimensions: car prices and required down payments. The required down
payment plays perhaps the most distinct role. For many buyers, a small increase in the minimum
down payment essentially has no e¤ect; they intend to make a down payment above the minimum
in any case. For buyers who intend to make the minimum down payment, however, an increase in
the requirement either leads them to take a smaller loan or causes them to forego the purchase
altogether. Because these buyers are relatively illiquid compared to an average buyer, and represent
relatively high risks, there can be a benet to reducing their loan size and potentially even a benet
to screening them out.
Changes in car prices play a dramatically di¤erent role. An increase in car prices has relatively
little e¤ect on the volume of sales or on the size of buyersdown payments. Instead, the primary
e¤ect of an increase in car prices is to increase loan sizes. This raises monthly payments but also
the probability of default. Optimal prices resolve this trade-o¤ to balance the benets of larger
payments with the correspondingly faster and more likely default. The model suggests that optimal
interest rate o¤ers involve a similar balancing e¤ect.
Having outlined the basic trade-o¤s in contract design, we use the pricing model to quantify the
value of using individual information about consumers to make nancing o¤ers. The advent of so-
phisticated credit scoring has revolutionized consumer credit markets over the last quarter century.
Because the rm sets car prices independent of the characteristics of individual customers, we focus
on the value of credit scoring to set minimum down payment requirements. As a comparison, we
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compute the rms per-customer prots if it could not distinguish at all between customers, and if
it had perfect information about their current liquidity. Compared to the case of uniform minimum
down requirement, we nd that the observed pricing increases prots by 10%, that optimal pricing
would increase prots by 18%, and that perfect information about current liquidity would increases
expected prots by 90%. Our ndings suggest that the company might benet from lowering mini-
mum down payments somewhat for the best risks, while raising them for the highest risks. Finally,
we quantify the value of information as increasing the barrier for potential entrants.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines a general model of demand and pricing
in contract markets. Section 3 describes subprime lending and our auto sales data. We develop
the demand and supply model, and discuss identication and estimation in Sections 4-6. Sections
7 and 8 present the results, and Section 9 concludes.
2 Demand and Pricing in Contract Markets
We consider a market consisting of a population of consumers, each described by a vector of
characteristics , and a single seller. To keep things simple, in this section we imagine the seller
o¤ers a single contract described by a vector of terms . In the case of a nanced auto sale, the
contract terms might include the car being o¤ered, its price, a maximum loan size or down payment
requirement, an interest rate, a schedule for payments, and so forth.
Each consumer chooses whether or not to accept the contract. We represent this decision by
the function g(; ); that is, a consumer with characteristics  accepts a contract  if and only if
g(; )  0. With this notation, total sales are
Q() =
Z
1fg(; )  0gdF (), (1)
where F () is the population distribution of individual characteristics.
Conditional on purchase, a transaction results in an outcome y(; ), which in a loan market
might be the fraction of loan payments that are made. The seller realizes a variable prot or net
revenue r(; y) that depends on the contract terms and the transaction outcome. Again in the
loan setting, a lenders return depends on the size of the loan, the interest rate, and the repayment
history.
This minimal model already allows for both selection and incentive e¤ects. Selection e¤ects
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arise if buyer characteristics a¤ect both the decision to purchase and transaction outcomes. In
adverse selection models of borrowing, for example, buyers at greater risk of default demand larger
loans. Incentive e¤ects arise if contract terms a¤ect transaction outcomes. For instance, in moral
hazard models of borrowing, a larger loan increases the probability of default.
The rms problem is to choose contract terms to maximize expected prot:
max
2
() = Q()  E [r(; y)jg(; )  0] : (2)
It is typical in analyzing product markets to treat all product characteristics other than price as
xed, at least in the short run. In credit and insurance markets, rms may be able to adjust several
dimensions of their o¤ers fairly easily. In our auto sales context, we focus on two particular pricing
terms: car price and the minimum down payment.
For now, however, lets focus on a single contract dimension and assume that g() is continuous
and strictly decreasing in . In this case, the e¤ect of a small change in the o¤ered contract is:
d()
d
=
dQ()
d
 E [r (; y(; )) j g (; ) = 0] +Q()  E

dr (; y(; ))
d
j g (; )  0

: (3)
The rst term reects the loss of customers who are just on the margin. The cost of losing these
customers depends on their protability  in principle, a marginal buyer could be more or less
protable than an average buyer. The second term reects the change in the return on inframarginal
buyers. In traditional product markets a one dollar increase in price translates directly to a one
dollar increase in revenue; here a change in the signed contract may have a more complex e¤ect.
For instance, an increase in the interest rate on a loan raises the monthly payment but might lower
the fraction of payments that are made.
It is possible to connect optimal pricing to the standard Lerner condition. To do this, let
R() = E[r(; y)jg(; )  0] denote the sellers expected revenue conditional on sale. With this
notation, expected prot is () = Q()R() and the rst order condition for optimal pricing is
(R=) =R = ( Q=) =Q. The rm equates the inverse elasticity of net revenue with the inverse
elasticity of demand. In the standard product market case, the relevant contract dimension is price
( = p) and the revenue from a transaction is r(p; ) = p  c, so the inverse elasticity of net revenue
is simply the markup (p   c)=p. Viewed in this light, pricing in contract markets obeys a Lerner
equation, only the impact of a price change on the average revenue from each sale might include
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selection and incentive e¤ects.
Now consider an empirical perspective. The economic fundamentals of the model are the distri-
bution of customer characteristics F (), the choice function g(; ), the outcome function y(; ),
the net revenue function r(; y), and the set of possible contracts . In our analysis below, in-
dividual data on choices and outcomes is available. For each individual i, we observe a subset of
individual characteristics, the contract she faces i, her purchase decision qi 2 f0; 1g, and if she
purchases, an outcome yi.
A natural approach to demand estimation therefore combines a latent variable selectionequa-
tion, qi = 1 if and only if g(i; i)  0, and a treatmentequation yi = y(i; i). These equations
permit estimates of F (), g() and y(). The second step is to use observed pricing behavior to
recover unobserved components of the cost structure, i.e. r(), from the rst-order conditions for
optimal pricing. Moreover, to the extent that observed pricing behavior generates more restrictions
on the data than there are unknowns, one can test if pricing decisions are indeed optimal.
The di¤erences between this approach and the standard analysis of product markets are small.
On the demand side, the only di¤erence is the existence of the outcome function. In estimating
demand for something like cereal, the idea is to use observed market shares or individual choice
data to estimate the distribution of customer characteristics F () and the choice function g().
Here we just add an additional outcome equation and use data on outcomes to also recover y().
On the supply side, the econometric di¤erences are even less important  we still use rst-order
conditions for prot maximization to recover marginal cost parameters  the only di¤erence is
that the rst-order conditions must be modied to account for selection and incentive e¤ects.
3 Used Cars and Subprime Auto Loans
Our study makes use of data from a company that operates used car dealerships across the United
States. The company specializes in selling to individuals with low incomes or poor credit histories.
Customers who arrive at a dealership ll out a loan application, identify a car they might purchase
and are quoted a price for it, and are given nancing options that reect their credit-worthiness.
Virtually all buyers nance a large fraction of their purchase, so the company originates a substantial
number of subprime loans. Defaults are common, and recoveries typically constitute only a small
fraction of car cost. For this reason, both customer selection and the structure of nancing are
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of central importance, making this an attractive setting to study optimal pricing and design of
consumer credit contracts.
For the present study, we obtained data on all loan applications and sales from June 2001
through December 2004. We observe well over 50,000 loan applications (we do not report the exact
number which is proprietary), about a third of which result in a purchase.4 We also obtained data
on the loan terms being o¤ered at any given time and the cost and list price of each car on the
lot. In addition to this data, we are able to track loan repayments and recoveries up to April 2006.
Compared to most industry studies, the data are extraordinarily detailed and complete.
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the applicant population and the terms and outcomes of
observed transactions. The typical applicant has a household income just under $29,000 a year, and
appears to have relatively little access to savings or credit. Only 17 percent of the applicants have
a FICO score above 600, a typical cut-o¤ for obtaining a standard bank loan, and 18 percent of
applicants have no FICO score at all. Although a small fraction, fteen percent, are homeowners,
almost a third have no bank account.
The companys inventory consists primarily of used cars between three and ve years old. The
company sets a list price for each car, but actual sale prices are negotiated at the dealership and
can depart somewhat from the list price. The average sale price is just under $11,000. Buyers must
make a minimum down payment of up to two thousand dollars but may nance any fraction of the
remainder of the purchase. Most of the loans originated by the company have three to four year
terms and annual interest rates of 25-30%.
Both the minimum down payment and the o¤ered interest rate depend on an applicants credit
category. The credit category is a discretized version of a proprietary credit score the company
assigns based on the applicants characteristics and credit history. Although interest rates are based
on credit category, around half of the loans we observe are at state-mandated maximum rates, and
much of the interest rate variation in the data arises from cross-state di¤erences in rate caps.
In our empirical analysis, we focus primarily on minimum down payments and car prices, rather
than interest rates or loan lengths. This focus is dictated partly by the available variation in the
data. During the sample period, we observe over twenty company-wide changes in down payment
4We report summary statistics based on the full sample of applicants and loans, but to reduce computational time,
we use a random subsample of 45,000 applicants to estimate the model. For the baseline model, the results that are
based on the full sample are very similar. However, because it takes more than a month to estimate the model using
the full sample, all the estimation results we report are based on this random subsample of 45,000 applicants.
7
requirements and two company-wide changes in car pricing. These changes, and additional discon-
tinuities in the down payment requirements and the pricing schedule, allow consistent estimates of
demand and revenue elasticities. Our analysis controls for loan length and the o¤ered interest rate,
but we are somewhat less condent in our ability to identify how changes in these nancing terms
a¤ect the quality and quantity of demand.
We also emphasize the decision of whether or not to purchase and how much to nance, rather
than the choice among cars. Again the motivation is two-fold. First, we are more interested in the
borrowing decision than in whether customers choose a Ford Escort that is three rather than four
years old. Second, adding a car choice dimension to the model adds complexity that appears to
have little e¤ect on the insights we derive about selection, liquidity and optimal pricing. Adams,
Einav, and Levin (2007) provide additional discussion and evidence on the latter point.
Just over one-third of applicants purchase a car, and these individuals tend to have somewhat
higher income and credit-worthiness than the average applicant. Virtually all buyers nance a large
fraction of the purchase price. Forty-three percent make exactly the minimum down payment, and
fewer than ten percent make a down payment that exceeds the minimum by a thousand dollars.
The average down payment is around $1,000, so that after taxes and fees the average loan size is a
bit under $11,000. This translates into monthly payments on the order of $400.
A large portion of loans end in default. Our data ends before the last payments are due on some
loans, but of the loans with uncensored payment periods, only 39% are repaid in full. Moreover,
when defaults occur, they tend to come early in the loan period. Nearly half the defaults occur
before a quarter of the payments have been made, and nearly 80 percent occur within the rst half
of the loan term. The recovered value in the event of default is typically a fairly small fraction of
the car cost. For 22 percent of defaults we observe, no recovery is made at all, sometimes because
the car has been in an accident or stolen. But even when the recovery value is positive, the average
present value of the recovery is less than $1,600, compared to an average car cost of around $6,000.
Taken together, these facts lead to a highly bimodal distribution of per-sale prots (Figure 1).
Three economic features of the market deserve particular attention. First, as emphasized by
Adams, Einav and Levin (2007) purchasing decisions are highly sensitive to customer liquidity.
Relatively small increases in the required down payment appear to have a disproportionately large
e¤ect on purchasing, and transitory income shocks appear to have a similarly dramatic e¤ect. For
instance, Adams, Einav and Levin (2007) document a nearly 50 percent increase in sales in early
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February, and connect this spike to the arrival of tax rebates, particularly for consumers who are
eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit.
A second feature of the market is that the probability of loan repayment decreases fairly dra-
matically with loan size. Figure 2(a) provides some rough evidence of this by plotting loan sizes in
the data against repayment probabilities. Here we group buyers into high,medium,and low
risk using the companys credit categories, and smooth the raw data using local linear regression.
For each group of buyers, the probability of repayment falls steadily with loan size.
Finally, there is substantial heterogeneity in the likelihood of default, which is strongly correlated
both with buyersobserved characteristics and with their initial nancing decisions. The former is
already suggested by Figure 2(a), where the likelihood of default is substantially higher for buyers
with worse credit scores. To investigate further, we divide each risk group into individuals that
made minimum down payments and those whose down payments exceed the minimum, and plot
repayment probabilities for each of the subgroups separately. These are presented in Figure 2(b),
restricting attention to the sample of uncensored loans. The default rate is 71 percent for high
risk buyers, compared to 44 percent for the low risk buyers. Moreover, buyers who make a down
payment of exactly the required minimum have an average default rate of 67 percent compared to
a rate of 56 percent for buyers who make a down payment above the minimum. As Figure 2(b)
suggests, this pattern is fairly uniform across di¤erent risk groups. The strong correlation between
nancing decisions and default survives the addition of controls for buyer and car characteristics
as well as xed e¤ects for dealership and time periods.
The correlation between nancing decisions and default rates has two natural explanations.
One is selection: buyers who choose to nance more heavily are those buyers who are more likely
to default. The alternative is a repayment or moral hazard e¤ect: a buyer who takes a larger
loan is less likely to repay, either because she cannot come up with the loan payments or because
the incentive to prioritize payments is reduced. Our analysis below shows that both e¤ects are
operative and quanties them in dollar terms.
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4 The Empirical Model: Demand
4.1 Preliminaries
We describe each applicant in the data by a vector of characteristics  =
 
xa; xd; "; u; 

. Here xa
is a vector of observed individual characteristics including age, income, credit category, and proxies
for wealth, and xd includes dealership and time dummies. The scalar characteristics "; u;  are not
observed in the data. We assume that " and u are known to the applicant at the time of purchase,
and hence a¤ects purchasing and borrowing, while  is determined later and a¤ects repayment.
Loosely, one can think of " and u as summarizing the individual liquidity and car ow utility (y0
and v0) in the behavioral model, while  capturing a one-dimensional summary of the subsequent
liquidity realization. It is natural to view all three components as likely correlated. One mechanism
is that ", u, and  all reect unobserved aspects of liquidity at the time of purchase and later, and
are therefore mechanically related. Another possibility is that buyers have private information
about the likelihood of future repayment (i.e. about ) and because they are forward-looking, this
information is reected in their purchasing and nancing decisions (i.e. in "). We discuss this
further in the end of this section.
As discussed earlier, we view car price and the minimum down payment as key components of
the rms o¤er. Given this, we summarize contract terms by  = (xc; p; d), where xc includes the
characteristics of the applicants preferred car on the lot, the o¤ered interest rate and loan length,
p is the price of the applicants preferred car, and d the required down payment. It is useful to
let x =
 
xa; xd; xc

denote the complete vector of observed characteristics other than price and
minimum down payment.
A potential transaction is described by (i; i) = (pi; di;xi; "i; ui; i). We let qi 2 f0; 1g denote
the decision of whether to purchase, Di the choice of down payment, and si the fraction of loan
payments that get made. The purchase decision is observed for all applicants, while the down
payment and repayment decisions are observed only for buyers. The goal of the model is to map
the characteristics (; ) into observed outcomes (q;D; s).
4.2 Price Negotiation
As mentioned earlier, the company sets a list price for each car, but customers have some ability
to negotiate at the dealership. To model price determination at the dealership level, we specify a
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simple linear relationship between the negotiated price pi and the list price li:
pi = li + x
0
i+ i: (4)
Here i is an unobservable aspect of negotiation that we allow to be correlated with "i and ui, the
buyers unobserved information at the time of purchase. A rough way to view the pricing equation
is that in the context of our nonlinear demand model, it plays the same role that using list price
as instrument for negotiated price would play in a linear demand model.
The coe¢ cient  is of particular interest. When we consider optimal price-setting, we consider
the company having control over list price, so  will reect the pass-through rate from headquarters
guidelines (through the setting of list price) to expected transaction prices in the foeld.
4.3 Purchase and Financing Decisions
Faced with an o¤er, the consumer decides whether or not to purchase and how large a down payment
to make. We model the purchase decision in standard discrete choice fashion as
qi = 1 , g(xi; pi; di; "i)  0: (5)
By modeling the purchase decision as a binary choice, we are thinking about the customers decision
of whether or not to purchase her preferred car on the lot.5
Since di is a constraint, it enterd the purchase decision g() only if it is binding. We therefore
specify
Di = x
0
ix + pip + ui: (6)
That is, Di is the ideal down payment, conditional on purchase. We can then write g() as
g(xi; pi; di; "i) =
8<: x0ix + pii + dii;d + "i if Di > dix0ix + pii + "i if Di  di ; (7)
and we can think of the coe¢ cient i;d as the (average) shadow price of the down payment con-
straint, conditional on it being binding.
5That is, the preferred car from among a small set of cars assigned to the applicant by the company. See Adams,
Einav, and Levin (2009) for more details.
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We specify the down payment decision as
Di =
8<: Di if Di > didi if Di  di (8)
A buyer will never put down more than the purchase price pi, but this constraint is never binding
in the data, so we omit it in presenting the model.
4.4 Loan Repayment
Once a purchase is made and a loan is extended, buyers make payments on a regularly scheduled
basis (most often bi-weekly, but sometimes more or less often). Rather than build the model
specically around the scheduled payments, we specify a continuous-time model of repayment.
Specically, we posit that consumer i will make a fraction of payments si 2 [0; 1], where:
si =
8<: si = exp (x0ix + (pi  Di) L + i) if si  11 if si > 1 : (9)
For loans that occur later in our sample, we do not observe the full repayment period. This creates
additional censoring that we account for in estimating the model, but we defer a complete discussion
of this detail to Appendix C.
We expect a key determinant of default to be the loan size pi   Di, which depends on the
earlier nancing decision. The fact that repayment depends on loan size, and the potential for
correlation between ", u, and , creates two links between choices at the time of purchase and loan
performance.
4.5 Stochastic Assumptions
To close the model, we specify a stochastic structure for the unobservables (i; "i; ui; i). We assume
that they are normally distributed, as follows:
0BBBBBB@
i
"i
ui
i
1CCCCCCA  N (0; V ) with V =
0BBBBBB@
2 "" uu 
"" 
2
" ""u ""
uu "u"u 
2
u uu
 "" uu 
2

1CCCCCCA (10)
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The correlation structure plays a central role. If " = u = 0, an individuals purchasing and
nancing decisions reveal no new information about later default. If "; u > 0 then buyers who
are more liquid are also better risks. In this case, conditional on the information available to the
rm, the group of buyers who demand the largest loans is adversely selected, and in addition a
marginal buyer represents a worse risk than the average buyer.
The other correlation parameters, ", u, and , play a role in identication. If " =  =
u = 0, the negotiated price is exogenous from the standpoint of an individual customer and
we can estimate demand without worrying about the negotiation process. Finally, the variance
parameters  ; "; u;  capture the importance of unobserved characteristics relative to observed
characteristics in negotiation and customer decisions.
4.6 Economic Interpretation of the Demand Model
The model we have described is a statistical representation of observed choice behavior. It is
designed to be consistent with a variety of underlying behavioral assumptions, but our intent is
to remain somewhat agnostic about the precise behavioral patterns underlying consumer choices.
For example, we allow for correlation between desired borrowing and propensity to default. This
correlation could reect a causal link  buyers who anticipate a high chance of default know they
should not make a large down payment  or simply the fact that buyers who are illiquid today
and cannot make a large down payment are likely to be illiquid tomorrow and unable to make their
loan payments. Similarly, we do not attempt to distinguish whether buyers default for discretionary
reasons (as in moral hazard models of consumer lending) or because of changes in their employment
or health status that leave them simply unable to make payments. Finally, we do not attempt to
estimate behavioral parameters such as individual discount factors or the accuracy of individual
expectations that might be important for welfare analysis.
There are several reasons for this. First, our main focus is on rm behavior and pricing decisions.
As should be clear from Section 2, for this particular problem, what matters is what consumers do
rather than why they do it. Second, building estimation around a full-blown behavioral model likely
would require strong and di¢ cult to test assumptions about consumer rationality, far-sightedness
and so forth. That being said, we want some assurance that our statistical model is consistent with
plausible economic behavior. In Appendix A, we provide one possible behavioral foundation for
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the demand model, based on rational, forward-looking utility maximization by consumers.6
5 The Empirical Model: Pricing
We now turn from the demand side to consider contract pricing from the perspective of the rm.
We rst derive conditions for optimal pricing and then explain how we can use the conditions to
infer unobserved cost parameters and assess the optimality of observed pricing decisions.
To analyze optimal pricing, we follow the framework presented in Section 2. We focus on the
sellers choice of car prices, or more precisely list prices, and minimum down payments, and treat
the interest rate and loan length as xed, although it would be possible to extend the analysis
in these directions. Conceptually, the extension from the earlier set-up is straightforward. The
operational di¢ culty lies in specifying what pricing strategies are available to the rm, and in
determining how strong an assumption of optimality to impose in estimation.
5.1 Optimal Pricing
Lets start by thinking about a single applicant (and an associated preferred car) with characteristics
given by (x; !). Here x =
 
xa; xd; xc

are the observable characteristics and ! = (; "; ) are the
unobservables.7 Suppose this individual is faced with a minimum down payment d, and the list
price on her preferred car is l. Drawing on our modeling above, the applicant will negotiate a price
p = l+x0+ and purchase the car if g (p; d; x; ")  0. Finally, let r (p; d; x; "; ) denote the sellers
net revenue from such a transaction  we will derive a detailed expression for this term in the next
section.
Putting these ingredients together, the sellers prot from applicant (x; !) given a minimum
down payment d and car list price l is
 (l; d;x; !) = 1

g
 
l + x0+ ; d; x; "
  0	  r  l + x0+ ; d; x; ";  : (11)
6Although we do not pursue it, in principle it would be possible to parameterize and estimate that model using
our current demand estimates as a starting point, along the lines of the two-stage estimation procedure in Bajari,
Benkard and Levin (2007).
7 In developing the pricing model, we continue to abstract from car choice. This involves a more substantive
restriction than when we consider the demand model alone, because a dramatic change in the pricing policy might
cause an applicant to substitute to a di¤erent preferred car. What we assume in our actual estimation is that a
small and uniform increase in all car prices will not change an applicants preferred car on the lot. This is true, for
example, if the indirect utility of consumers is separable and linear in price.
14
Now consider the set of possible policies for setting the minimum down payment and list price.
The information available to the rm consists of the observable characteristics x so in theory any
functions d (x) and l(x) could be a feasible policy for minimum down payments and list prices.
We assume that in setting o¤er terms the distribution of applicant characteristics is known, and
denote this distribution by F (x; !). If the company adopts a pricing policy l() and minimum down
payment schedule d(), total prots are
(l; d) =
Z
 (l; d;x; !) dF (x; !) : (12)
Therefore if  is the set of feasible pricing policies, the policy (l; d) is optimal if and only if
(l; d)  (l0; d0) for all (l0; d0) 2 .
From the perspective of the manager choosing list prices and a minimum down payment sched-
ule, a critical decision is how nely to tailor o¤ered contract terms to the individual characteristics
of applicants and the characteristics of the cars on the lot, and also how often to make adjustments.
Given the wealth of available information, this problem is non-trivial. For instance, car prices could
be contingent on the precise description of the car  make, model, color, cost at auction, and the
price could be discounted if the car does not sell for some period of time. Similarly, nancing terms
such as the minimum down payment can be made contingent on an individuals credit history, her
veried income, or on the vehicle she is purchasing.8
The minimum down payment and list price schedules we observe in the data, while sophisticated,
are signicantly coarser than what is feasible. At any point in time at a given dealership, the
minimum down payment depends only on an applicants credit category, and the list price depends
only on car cost. A textbook analysis might also suggest that these schedules should be changed in
response to any new information about the distribution of applicant characteristics. In addition,
changes in the list price schedule occur relatively infrequently, only twice during the sample period.
We take this coarseness into account in our estimation strategy, and then return to it in our analysis
of alternative pricing policies in Section 8.
8As a matter of policy the company is committed to treating applicants equally with respect to the list prices on
its cars. The company does this so that di¤erences in the nancing arrangements o¤ered to buyers are transparent
and depend only on standard loan features: interest rate, length of loan, and minimum down payment (or maximum
loan size).
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5.2 Revenue Accounting
In this section we derive an expression for the rms net revenue from a given sale. Net revenue is
the sum of four components: the initial down payment, the discounted value of the stream of loan
payments, the discounted recovery in the event of default, and nally the total costs of the sale.
Let D denote the initial down payment, p D the amount that is borrowed, z the interest rate on
the loan, T the length of the loan, S the length of time for which loan payments are made, k the
nominal time-S recovery value, and C the costs incurred in selling the car. Finally, let  denote
the rms internal discount rate.
With this notation in place, the present value of net revenue from the sale is
r = D +
1

 
1  e S
1
z (1  e zT )
(p D) + e Sk(S)  C: (13)
The rst and last terms, the down payment and cost of the car, are realized immediately. The
second term is the present value of loan payments, where the fraction in the expression represents
the present value return on each dollar of loan principal. The third term is the discounted value of
recovery. Clearly if the loan is paid in full so S = T , there is no associated recovery and k(T ) = 0.
To relate this accounting exercise to our statistical model, consider an individual applicant with
characteristics (x; !), who faces a car price p and minimum down payment d. The down payment
D (p; d; x; !), and resulting repayment length S = s (p; d; x; !)T are given by the demand model
of Section 4. The other loan terms z and T are taken as given (i.e. they are elements of x). The
rms internal discount rate  is a new parameter. Industry knowledge suggests that this is likely
to be somewhere in the 8-12% range.
Recovery value is not a component of the demand model of Section 4. We simplify computation
by modeling and estimating this quantity separately. The model we consider assumes there is a
discrete probability of no recovery. Conditional on a recovery being made, we specify a linear model
for the dollar value. The details are described in Appendix B. In estimating recoveries separately
from the rest of the demand system we assume that unobserved heterogeneity in the recovery value
is independent of other unobservables. We view this as relatively unproblematic, particularly as
net recovery value is a fairly small fraction of the total revenue for most consumers and is realized
only for those who default.
The nal component of protability is the marginal cost incurred from a sale. We observe
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detailed information on the cost of acquiring each car and transporting it to the lot, so it seems
reasonable to assume that we observe the direct nancial costs associated with each sale. Discussions
with the rm, however, indicate that for various reasons limiting deal ow is a signicant concern,
and enters their thinking in setting list prices and particularly minimum down payments. Because
of this, we assume that in addition to the direct dollar cost c of a given car, there is an additional
indirect or shadow cost  associated with making an extra sale, so that total costs are
C = c+  : (14)
Our baseline model assumes  is constant across our data sample, though we report other speci-
cations that relax this assumption.
5.3 Empirical Specication
The goal of this section is to derive empirical restrictions arising from assumptions about optimal
pricing. Our basic idea is to require that observed list prices and minimum down payments result
in higher expected prot than viable alternatives. The key modeling issue is how large a set of
alternative policies to consider. Because the environment is complicated, we are hesitant to impose
too strong an assumption of optimality. Instead we consider two alternatives.
The rst restriction we consider takes the observed pricing structure as essentially xed in terms
of changes over time, across cars and across applicants. We require only that on average the general
level of prices and minimum down payments was correct from a prot-maximization standpoint.
More specically, we assume that the rm would not benet by uniformly raising or lowering its list
prices or minimum down payments. Letting l(x); d(x) denote the observed policies for list prices
and minimum down payments, we require that:
Z
 (l(x); d(x);x; !) dF (x; !) 
Z
 (l(x) + a; d(x) + b;x; !) dF (x; !) for all a; b 2 R: (15)
The second restriction we consider is motivated by the idea that the company may be satis-
cingor looking for marginal improvements in its pricing structure. For this strategy, we assume
that each observed change in the minimum down payment or list price schedule improves over the
prior schedule for the price period that it is in e¤ect. To this end, we break the data into pricing
periods indexed by  , and let l (x); d (x) denote the observed pricing policies in period  . We
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then assume that for each  , the observed policies l ; d generate more prot in expectation than
l 1; d 1:Z
 (l (x); d (x);x; !) dF (x; !) 
Z
 (l 1(x); d 1(x);x; !) dF (x; !) for all  > 1: (16)
Note that this satiscingapproach is neither more nor less restrictive than the rst approach.
6 Identication and Estimation
In this section we discuss estimation and the variation in the data that identies the unknown
demand and supply parameters. The variation in the data allows us to take an empirical approach
that separates the estimation of demand and supply parameters. Under this approach, we start by
estimating the demand system, making no assumptions about the optimality of observed contract
terms. We then combine the estimated demand system with the restrictions derived from the pricing
model to estimate the remaining supply parameters. Although one could, in principle, estimate
demand and supply jointly, we view it as preferable to use credible identifying variation to recover
demand and avoid imposing specic pricing structure except where it is required. Throughout
this section, we keep the discussion at a verbal level and defer specic formulas and details of
implementation to Appendix C.
6.1 Exploiting the Individual-Level Data
To fully exploit the rich individual-level nature of the data, we estimate the model using the choices
and outcomes of loan applicants. The use of applicant data raises two issues that merit discussion.
The rst issue concerns the process by which applicants arrive in the sample. By focusing on
the pool of applicants, we in e¤ect take the arrival of customers at the lot to be independent of
the companys pricing decisions, at least conditional on year and month dummies. We think this
assumption is reasonable for at least two reasons. First, for many of the dealerships in our sample,
pricing information was not publicly posted. Second, most of the customers who arrive at the
lot are referred by standard car dealers who cannot o¤er nancing to individuals with poor credit
history. There is su¢ cient market segmentation that these dealers have little reason to be aware of
or care about pricing changes at the rm we are studying.9
9An alternative approach would be to estimate demand at a more aggregated level, implicitly or explicitly con-
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The second issue concerns the completeness of the data for non-purchasers. For applicants who
do not purchase a car, we can compute their potential nancing terms, but we dont observe their
preferred car on the lot or the price they might have negotiated. The obvious remedy and the
one we adopt is to impute the missing data. For each applicant who does not purchase, we select
at random an applicant in the same credit and income category who purchased a car in the same
week at the same dealership, and assign the non-purchasing applicant the same car and negotiated
price.10
6.2 Identication
Our analysis emphasizes car prices and minimum down payments as the two key contract terms
that are determined endogenously in the demand and supply model. By focusing on these contract
terms, we treat the structure of interest rates and loan lengths, the pool of applicants arriving on
the lot, and their car choices as exogenous. How then do we identify the e¤ect of car prices and
minimum down payments on consumer choices?
First consider minimum down payments. Because these are set at the company level, and the
company has available to it precisely the information in our data, we are not much concerned with
a correlation between the minimum down payment faced by an individual in the data and her
individual-level unobservable characteristics. That is, traditional endogeneity seems unlikely to be
a problem. What then creates identifying variation? The pricing model suggests that the company
should adjust its minimum down payment schedule in response to changes in the distribution of
applicant and car characteristics. It is also possible that rougher forms of experimentation than
are suggested by the model of optimal pricing would create identifying variation.
In fact, we observe more than twenty changes in the minimum down payment schedule. Even
with year and month controls, these changes provide time-series variation in the minimum payments
for each credit category. And because the changes are rarely uniform across credit categories, we
also have a source of di¤erence-in-di¤erences identication. It is also possible to exploit additional
variation by controlling continuously for the underlying credit score, but not credit category per
se, and using regression discontinuity to compare buyers with credit scores just above and below
structing a pool of potential applicants, or alternatively to develop a more formal model of the applicant arrival
process. In our view, the former makes sub-optimal use of the data, while the latter adds extra complication with
little benet.
10We also experimented with iterating the price imputation based on our estimated correlation structure between
"i and i. A short summary of those experiments is that it was a lot of work with little impact on the results.
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the threshold for di¤erent credit categories. In Adams, Einav and Levin (2007) we provide a more
detailed discussion of this variation.
Identifying the e¤ect of changes in car price on customer purchasing and borrowing decisions is
more challenging. One di¢ culty is that because we impute prices for non-purchasers, we potentially
lose some of the true variation in the data. A second di¢ culty, accounted for in our demand model,
is that negotiated prices may be correlated with unobserved buyer characteristics. To the extent
that such a correlation exists, identication in the model comes from changes in the list prices
set at the company level. We observe two major changes in the margin schedule used to generate
list prices, creating identifying time-series and di¤erences-in-di¤erences variation. In addition, list
prices jump discontinuously at certain cost thresholds. By controlling continuously for car cost,
this provides a source of regression discontinuity identication. Again, Adams, Einav and Levin
(2007) provide more detail.
Especially in contrast to the demand side, identication of the supply parameters is straightfor-
ward. Given consistent estimates of the demand system and the distribution of applicant character-
istics, each of our assumptions about the optimality of observed pricing generates at least enough
restrictions on the data to identify the main supply-side parameter: the rms indirect cost of a
sale  .
6.3 Estimating the Model
Our approach to estimation separates demand estimation from inference about the supply parame-
ters. To do this, we rst use maximum likelihood to estimate the demand system, which consists of
the pricing equation (4), the purchasing and borrowing equations (5) and (8), and the repayment
equation (9), combined with the stochastic assumption on the unobservables in equation (10). The
likelihood function is written out in Appendix C. We then condition on the demand parameters
and use the supply-side restrictions (15) and (16) to estimate the supply parameters. To do this,
we focus on small uniform changes in list prices and minimum down payments (i.e. small discrete
changes in a and b in the supply inequalities) and use a grid search to nd values of  that make
the observed prices optimal against these very limited alternatives. This exercise is a special case
of Pakes et al. (2006), who provide a more general approach for estimation in the presence of
inequality constraints. Complete details are in the Appendix.
The advantage of the two-stage approach is that it allows us to estimate the demand system
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using minimal assumptions about the process driving prices. We require only that decisions made
at the company level, conditional on year and month dummies, are based on available company
data. The disadvantage is that if one strongly believes pricing is optimal, or at least preferable to
some limited and identiable set of alternative policies, this information is not used to rene the
demand estimates.
7 Results
In this section, we discuss our results from the estimated demand and supply model. We break the
discussion into four parts: the ability of the model to t that data, the determinants of purchasing,
borrowing and repayment behavior, the correlation between individual decisions, and nally the
estimated supply parameters.
7.1 Comparing the Estimated Model and the Data
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the data next to averages predicted by the model, showing
that we are able to t the key moments in the data fairly well. Figures 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) show the
distributions of down payments and repayment lengths observed in the data and predicted by the
model. The model does well in matching the distribution of down payments and repayment length.
This suggests that the distributional assumptions imposed by the model  truncated normal in
the case of down payments and truncated lognormal in the case of repayment length  are not
particularly restrictive. In fact, we tried to estimate versions of the model with an additional
parameter that tilted the repayment distribution, and couldnt reject the baseline specication.
7.2 Purchasing, Borrowing and Repayment Behavior
The rst two column of Table 3(a) report our estimates of purchasing and borrowing behavior.
The rst column reports the marginal e¤ects of the variables on the probability of sale. The second
column reports the determinants of individuals down payments. Consistent with the ndings of
Adams, Einav and Levin (2007), customer liquidity appears to be an important factor in explaining
purchase decisions. The close rate, or probability that an applicant purchases, is very sensitive to
the required down payment and much less sensitive to changes in the car price. A 100 dollar
increase in the required down payment lowers the probability of sale by 2.2 percentage points,
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which is equivalent to about 6.4% reduction in volume. In contrast, a 100 dollar increase in car
prices doesnt have any economically meaningful e¤ect on the probability of sale. We estimate
that an increase in car prices also has a relatively small e¤ect on a buyers desired down payment;
in particular, we estimate that a 100 dollar increase in car prices raises a buyers desired down
payment by about $9. Therefore, it appears that the primary e¤ect of a change in car prices is to
increase the size of loans that buyers take. We return to this point below.
Further evidence of the importance of liquidity can be seen in the coe¢ cient on the month
dummy variable for February. All else xed, the close rate in February is 17 percentage points
higher, or 50%, and desired down payments are 500 dollars higher. Applicant characteristics are also
consistent with liquidity e¤ects. For example, applicants with higher income and applicants with a
bank account are more likely to purchase and to make larger down payments while applicants who
own a house are less likely to purchase and conditional on purchase make smaller down payments.
We control for individual credit scores by including dummy variables for the companys discrete
credit categories. Table 3(a) reports the coe¢ cients for three representative categories  a high-
risk category, a medium-risk category and a low-risk category. The estimates imply that medium-
risk applicants are the most likely to purchase, while the high credit risk have the highest desire
to borrow. One interpretation for the non-monotonicity in purchase probability is that low-risk
buyers have better outside opportunities.
Our estimates of repayment behavior are reported in the third column of Table 3(a). As one
might expect, loan size is a primary determinant of payment duration and hence the likelihood
of default. All else equal a buyer who takes a $1,000 larger loan (which translates into monthly
payments being about 35 dollars higher) makes about 19 percent fewer payments. Payment duration
varies with individual and car characteristics in ways that are largely predictable. All else equal,
buyers are less likely to default on higher quality cars, and buyers with greater income or with a
bank account are more likely to make payments. The companys credit score varies strongly with
the expected repayment. A representative low risk buyer is expected to make 88 percent more
payments than a representative high risk buyer and is 22 percent less likely to default.
7.3 Selection E¤ects
The bottom of Table 3 reports the estimated variances and covariances of the unobserved individual
characteristics. Consistent with our earlier discussion of Figure 2, unobserved drivers of purchasing
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and down payment are positively correlated with the fraction of loan payments made. All else equal,
a buyer who is inclined to make a $100 larger down payment is expected to make 4.2 percent more
of her payments.
Now consider two buyers who are identical on all observables, only one chooses to make a $500
larger down payment. This decision has a direct e¤ect on loan repayment because it reduces the
size of the loan. This direct e¤ect increases the expected fraction of payments made by 9.3 percent.
Moreover, there is a signalling value. The large down payment reveals greater liquidity at the time
of sale, which is correlated with making payments later on. The model suggests that facing equal
loan principal, the buyer who pays $500 more down will make 11.5 percent more payments. Thus
the signalling value of a larger down payment is signicant, and similar in magnitude to the direct
e¤ect of lowering loan size.
An alternative way to view the selection is to compare an average buyer with an average non-
buyer. The estimated model suggests that the average buyer, given an average loan size, will
make 61 percent of her payments on average, and has a 60 percent chance of default. An average
non-buyer, given the same loan size, would be expected to make 49 percent of her payments and
would have a 73 percent chance of default. So we can view selection on the purchase decision as
advantageous  the average buyer represents a substantially better risk than the average non-buyer
 but selection on the borrowing decision as adverse, in the sense that buyers who demand larger
loans are worse risks.
Interestingly, we estimate that the correlation between the negotiated price and the (unobserved)
credit risk is small but negative. The small correlation may suggest that credit worthiness that
is unobserved to headquarters is also unlikely to be observed to the sales person, so that price
negotiation outcome is mainly driven by aspects that are orthogonal to liquidity and repayment
risk. The negative correlation reects the better risk applicants are able to negotiate slightly better
prices. For example, an applicant who signals his better type by paying down $100 more, faces on
average a 0.15 percent lower price for the car.
7.4 Supply Estimates
Table 3(b) reports estimates of the key supply parameter obtained in the second stage estimation.
Based on our conversation with the company, we assume that the rms internal discount rate is
10%, and estimate the shadow cost of adjusting inventory. We nd that for o¤ered prices and
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nancing to be prot-maximizing, even against a very limited class of alternatives that consists of
uniform shifts in the pricing or minimum down payment schedules, the unobserved component of
costs must be fairly large, on the order of 2,400 dollars for a marginal sale. This is our baseline
estimate, which is used for the counterfactual exercises in the next section. Supply side estimation
that relies on various specications of learning or satiscingmodels as reported in the top panel
of Table 3(b) produce remarkably similar estimates.
This high inferred cost reects hesitancy to scale up operations, which may be driven by several
explanations. One natural explanation is that the company cannot replicate its business instanta-
neously, and scaling up takes time. Indeed, the company opened a number of dealerships, including
some in areas served by older dealerships, during the observation period. An alternative explana-
tion is that the company was concerned about the overall risk of its originated loans in particular
the possibility of macroeconomic shocks. That is, our estimates are driven by the realized risks in
the data, while the company may have optimized against a wider distribution of events.
The data are less favorable to two other hypotheses we have considered. One is that the high
inferred cost is driven primarily by a hesitancy to expand sales to higher-risk borrowers. As Table
3(b) suggests, when we allow the shadow cost parameter to vary by the observed credit risk, we
estimate the shadow cost to be signicantly higher for good risks rather than for bad risks. The
second possibility is that it is driven by high costs of short-run scale adjustments, as are required
when demand spikes in tax season. As Table 3(b) shows, however, when we allow the shadow cost
parameter to vary in tax season, the estimates do not change much, suggesting that costly short-run
scale adjustments are not driving the overall estimates.
8 Implications for Contract Pricing
In this section we use the estimated model to illuminate the trade-o¤s involved in optimizing
repayment revenue and customer selection, and to calculate the value generated by credit scoring,
and also seasonal pricing.
8.1 Di¤erential E¤ect of Contract Terms
A useful starting point for thinking about the trade-o¤s involved in setting car prices and minimum
down payments is to trace graphically how changes in contract terms a¤ect two key outcomes: the
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probability of purchase and the probability of default. Figure 5 illustrates the e¤ects of changes in
the minimum down payment for low risk and high risk applicants. The counterfactual probabilities
of sale (short-dashed lines) and default (long-dashed lines) are computed from the estimated demand
model for a range of required down payments.
As Figure 5 shows, an increase in the required down payment substantially reduces close rates
for both credit categories and substantially decreases the probability of default. To understand
these e¤ects, it is useful to break the set of applicants into three categories, and consider how
the increase in the required down payment a¤ects each group. The rst set of applicants are
marginal buyers: this group was making minimum or near-minimum down payments at the lower
requirement, and decides not to purchase at the higher down payment. The second set of applicants
are inframarginal buyerswho nevertheless would ideally make a down payment below the higher
minimum. These applicants continue to purchase when the required down payment is raised, but
are forced to raise their down payments accordingly. The nal set of applicants are those who are
una¤ected by the increase in the required down payment, either because they were unwilling to
purchase even at the lower minimum, or because their ideal down payment is above the higher
minimum, so neither requirement constrains their behavior.
Aggregating these three groups of applicants delivers the e¤ects illustrated in Figure 5. The
substantial drop in the close rate shows that the set of marginal applicants is substantial relative
to the overall applicant population. The increase in the probability of repayment results from a
combination of selection and incentive e¤ects. The group of marginal buyers is no longer represented
once the down payment requirements is raised and this group both makes lower immediate payments
and defaults at a higher rate than other buyers. Also, the fact that some inframarginal buyers are
forced to raise their down payments means they now take smaller loans and consequently their
probability of payment increases.
The dark solid line of Figure 5 shows the e¤ect on prots of changes in the required down pay-
ment. The panel suggests that increasing the required down payment would increase the expected
prot from high risk applicants, by screening out marginal buyers who generate losses for the rm.
For low risk applicants, however, the model suggests that an increase in the required down payment
would decrease prots. This reects a nding we discuss in the next subsection, that even marginal
low risk applicants appear to represent positive prot opportunities for the rm.
An important point that is reected only indirectly in this picture is the e¤ect of applicants
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with di¤erent credit scores being faced with di¤erent required down payments. Applicants who
are observably higher risk face substantially higher required down payments. This has two e¤ects.
First, the set of these applicants who select into purchasing is much more selected  the close
rate for high risk applicants is 25 percent compared to 45 percent for low risk applicants. Second,
conditional on purchase, high risk buyers are constrained in their ability to borrow. A much higher
proportion of high risk buyers make the minimum down payment relative to low risk buyers (57
percent versus 23 percent). The model suggests that both e¤ects should serve to strongly lower the
default likelihood of the high risk buyers in the data.
While changes in the required down payment operate primarily by screening marginal buyers,
changes in car prices have a very di¤erent e¤ect, illustrated in Figure 6. We generate this gure in
the same way as the previous gure, only with the counterfactual outcomes incorporating changes
in car prices. The results (in Table 3) imply that such an increase has a very small change on both
the probability of purchase, as illustrated by the short-dashed line in Figure 6. That is, the primary
e¤ect of an increase in car prices is to increase the loan size of buyers by (almost) a corresponding
amount. This increase in loan size, however, has a substantial e¤ect on repayment, as illustrated
by the long-dashed line in Figure 6. The probability of repayment falls substantially for both credit
categories. The dark solid line shows the e¤ect on prots, showing the increase in payment size
and the decrease in payments trade, so that an increase in car prices has very little e¤ect on the
expected prots per applicant.
The discussion of Figures 5 and 6 illustrates the very di¤erent roles that required down payment
and car prices play in this setting. Required down payment is primarily a screening device, which
a¤ects volume (the probability of sale) and has only a minimal direct e¤ect on repayment (that
is, not through selection of better risks). In contrast, car prices are primarily used to control
repayment, and their level reects a trade-o¤ between the dollar amount of monthly payments and
the probability of default.
8.2 Optimal Pricing
In this Section we translate the e¤ects displayed in Figures 5 and 6 into numbers and quantify
the trade-o¤s in contract design more precisely. To this end, it is again useful to think about a
uniform increase in minimum down payments or in car prices across the sample. To understand
the trade-o¤, analogously to the rst order condition presented in equation (3), the e¤ect on prots
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from a discrete change in pricing can be approximated by
  Q  E [r j marginal buyer] +Q  E [r j average buyer] : (17)
For example, an increase in the required minimum can be decomposed of two parts: the lost prots
(which could be positive or negative) from marginal buyers who decide not to purchase after the
change, and the average e¤ect on revenues from inframarginal buyers.
In light of this decomposition, Table 4 uses our parameter estimates to report these quantities
separately. The top rows in Table 4 present the strong selection e¤ects we already mentioned:
the average buyer is much more protable to the rm than the marginal buyer, who is in turn
much more protable than the average non-buyer. While this pattern holds for all risk categories,
it is interesting to note that for low risk applicants, the average non-buyer would still be more
protable to the rm than the average buyer in worse risk categories, reecting the importance of
credit scoring.
The rest of Table 4 calculates the e¤ect of a 100 dollar increase in the minimum down and a
1,000 dollar increase in car prices. Using the equation above, consider rst the e¤ect of increasing
the minimum down. The rst e¤ect is the loss of marginal consumers: overall close rates decrease
by 2.2 percentage points. Since the marginal buyer is worth, in expectation, about $600 to the
rm, it makes the increase undesirable. However, the same change implies an increase in prots of
almost $30 from each inframarginal buyer, balancing this e¤ect. The e¤ect of a change in price is
quite di¤erent. Here, as already suggested by Figure 6, the close rate is not a¤ected by much, so
the rst part of the equation above is small. The second part is high, reecting the fact that, given
our results and the internal discount rate we impose, protability can be higher by charging higher
prices. We return to this below.
Figure 5 illustrates the implications of these results by graphing the expected per-applicant
prots for the rm as a function of the level of the required down payment. The gure shows
several things. First, note that it veries that, given the other parameters, satisfying the rst order
conditions indeed leads to prot maximization. Second, it shows how protability can be improved.
Recall that the preferred specication constrains the rm to only choose the level of required down
payment, and doesnt allow the rm to change the spread of required down payments across credit
categories. Figure 5 shows that widening the spread, by reducing the required minimum for good
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risks and increasing the required minimum for bad risks, could substantially increase prots. Of
course, there may be other reason why such a spread may be di¢ cult to achieve in practice.
Figure 6 repeats the same exercise for the choice of price (or margin). As already mentioned,
given our current estimates and the level we impose for the internal discount rate, optimal car prices
are higher than what we observe them to be. Given that company has experimented frequently
with changes in the required down payment, and much less often with changes in car prices, it is
not implausible that deviations from optimality are greater in the price dimension. One can also
ask how optimal prices would vary across credit risks. For a given car, the company always sets
a single list price for all consumers, but interestingly, if it was possible to o¤er di¤erent prices to
di¤erent applicants, the rm would have had an incentive to reduce relative prices for high risk
applicants in order to increase their likelihood of repayment.
8.3 Risk-Based Financing and the Value of Information
In this section we calculate the value of making nancing o¤ers contingent on applicant information.
Tables 5(a), 5(b), and 5(c) summarize our ndings, by reporting the protability of the company
under di¤erent scenarios. Starting with Table 5(a), we report the current protability of the
company, as well as the counterfactual protability, if the company could price more e¢ ciently, or
if it had no access to its credit scoring technology. Overall, our estimates imply that, on average,
each applicant arriving at the lot is worth to the company $402, given its current pricing policy. We
estimate that optimal setting of required down payment that is, the increased spread presented
in Figure 7 would increase these prots by 26 dollars or 6.5%. In contrast, without the ability
to categorize applicants by credit risk, optimal (uniform) pricing implies a per-applicant prots of
$364, which is 9.4% less than current prots and 15% less than optimal risk-contingent prots.
Table 5(a) also reports protability for di¤erent risk groups. It is illustrative of the mechanism
through which risk-based nancing is valuable. Compared to risk-based pricing, uniform pricing
requires higher down payments from low risks and lower down payment from high risks. This
signicantly changes the selection of customers, reducing the close rate of low risks by more than a
third and more than doubles the close rate of high risks. As the marginal good risk is much more
protable to the company than the average bad risk, this worse selection results in a signicant
loss of prots.
Finally, Table 5(a) also computes how much potential there is in risk-based nancing, by
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allowing the rm the ability to price on individual characteristics it doesnt observe. In particular,
we assume the rm could price on the individuals "i (but not on i) and recompute prots. This
should provide an upper bound for the value of information unless the rm can get access to predic-
tors of i which are better than current xi and "i. Our results suggest that perfect information
would increase prots substantially. Per-applicant prots would increase by 90% compared to the
case of optimal uniform pricing, by 62% compared to the case of optimal pricing based on current
risk categorization, and by 72% compared to current observed pricing. These results may indicate
that despite the recent expansion of credit markets, partly due to improvement in risk classication
and credit scoring, consumers still have signicant private information that remain unpriced.
In Table 5(b) we report a similar exercise, where we ask how important seasonal pricing is. In
particular, as we mentioned earlier and conrm by our large estimates of the February e¤ects, the
tax rebate season introduces a larger pool of applicants who face less liquidity constraints at the
time of purchase. Indeed, the company raises the required down payments during tax season. The
results are summarized at the bottom panel of Table 5(b), by computing protability on a per-tax-
season-applicant basis. Optimal seasonal pricing improves protability from tax-season applicants
by $32 or about 7% compared to pricing schedule which is constant over the year. Both optimal
pricing schedules are more protable than the observed pricing.
Tables 5(a) and 5(b) quantify the value of contingent nancing o¤ers. This value is created by
a combination of the better ability of contingent o¤ers to screen bad risks, as well as the ability to
better tailor nancing o¤ers to specic customers and to o¤er terms that are more customized to
individual applicants. More contingent nancing terms also create value through their e¤ect on the
likelihood of potential entry. Table 5(c) summarizes our results from exercises that consider such
potential entry. While these exercises clearly take us much more out of sample and rely on many
stylized assumptions, they are illustrative as to the extent to which information may operate as an
entry barrier.
In Table 5(c) we compute equilibrium per-applicant prots for a set of monopolistic and
duopolistic scenarios. Each cell in the matrix presents the prots for the incumbent company
rst, and the prots for the potential entrant second. When an entrant is not present (top row),
the prots of the incumbent simply replicate the gures already presented in Table 5(a). When
an entrant is present, prots depend on whether the incumbent can use credit grades for pricing,
and whether this technology is also available to the entrant. In each scenario, we nd the Nash
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Equilibrium of the duopoly game, where each of the rms simultaneously set uniform or grade-
based required down payments, depending on the situation. Note that in our model a fraction of
the applicants are una¤ected by the required down payment, and these applicants represent better-
than-average risks. We assume that such applicants are randomly split between the two rms. We
also make the strong assumption that car prices remain the same through this analysis.11
The top row of Table 5(c) imply that the value of information for a monopolist is $64 per
applicant. Information also has an entry-deterring benet: better selection of applicants for an
incumbent implies also that a competitor who doesnt have that information (and therefore has to
price uniformly) would face worse selection of applicants. We compute that information reduces
the potential competitors prots by $45 per applicant. That is, the break-even sunk entry cost
that would justify entry need to be 27% lower when an incumbent can o¤er contingent nancing
terms. Interestingly, Table 5(c) also shows that even if entry is accommodated, the incentive to o¤er
grade-based pricing is higher in the presence of competition, with per-applicant prots increasing
by $81 or 48% compared to $64 or 17% when the company is a monopolist.
9 Conclusion
Economists increasingly have access to detailed transaction data from insurance, credit and other
contract markets. These data o¤er the promise of radically advancing our understanding of markets
with asymmetric information, and providing a laboratory to test and apply the large theoretical
literature on pricing and contract design. In this paper, we have tried to take a small step toward
realizing this agenda by analyzing optimal pricing and contract design in the market for subprime
auto sales and loans. We hope the approach taken here will encourage future empirical work on
pricing and contract design in settings of asymmetric information.
Our principal economic ndings concern the design of contracts in the face of informational
imperfections in credit markets. In subprime lending, correlation between default risk and current
liquidity make up-front payment requirements a powerful screening instrument. Our estimates show
that even modestly relaxing these requirements can greatly expand and increase the riskiness of the
pool of borrowers. Our estimates also reveal a high value, both direct and strategic, to innovations
11We calculate a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) for all cases assuming rms must choose from a discretized
set of prices. As a general theoretical matter, the existence of a PSNE is not assured when one rm chooses a grade-
based minimum and the other rm a uniform minimum. Fortunately, we do not encounter a non-existence problem
for our particular calibrated model.
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in credit scoring that allow o¤ers to be based on the observed riskiness of loan applicants.
We have focused this paper on contract design and rm behavior. To do this, we formulated
a structural model of rm behavior, but a fairly reduced-form model of consumer behavior.
A benet of this approach is that our conclusions do not rely on assumptions about nancial
sophistication, the accuracy of consumer expectations, discounting and so forth that would likely
be controversial and hard-to-assess. There are, however, two costs. One is that assumptions along
these lines are necessary to draw quantitative welfare conclusions. The other is that our more
reduced form model limits the range of out-of-sample counterfactual exercises we can perform.
For example, absent such variation in the data, we cannot use our approach to evaluate a change in
the rms collection policy or the introduction of a front-loaded or back-loaded repayment schedule.
In future work we plan to bring to bear additional repayment data that will allow us to go deeper
into these issues.
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Appendix A: An economic model of consumer behavior
In this appendix we present an economic model of consumer behavior that maps to the econometric model we
estimate. We consider a T+1 period setting. In period 0, a consumer with initial income y0 has the option to
purchase a car with nancing. Let p denote the car price, and d the required down payment. The consumer
can borrow L, up to p  d, to purchase the car, with a required payments of m (L) = (rL) =

1  (1 + r) T

in each of periods t = 1; :::; T . The consumer cannot do any additional borrowing, nor can he save. In each
period t = 1; :::; T , the consumer receives a stochastic income yt; if she has not yet defaulted on a payment,
she decides whether to make her payment and keep the car for another period.
Let F0 denote the distribution of initial income and suppose that over time income follows a Markov
process, so that yt has a distribution Ft (ytjyt 1). Assume that the income process is persistent so that Ft
is increasing in yt 1 in the rst-order stochastic dominance sense.
Consumer utility comes from consuming a car and/or money. Let vt be the consumption value of the
car and ut (c) the utility derived from consuming c dollars in period t. We assume that each ut is increasing
and concave, and satises the boundary condition that u0t(0) =1, and that there is no discounting.12
We solve the consumers problem by backward induction. At time T , if the consumer does not have the
car, she consumes her income yT , realizing utility uT (yT ). If she has the car, she makes her nal payment if
and only if vT + uT (yT  m (L))  uT (yT ), which obtains if yT is above some threshold yT (L). Note that
the income threshold will be higher for a larger loan, i.e. yT (L) is increasing in L.
Let UT (yT 1; L) denote the consumers expected utility just prior to the realization of yT ; so:
UT (yT 1; L) = E [max fvT + uT (yT  m (L)); uT (yT )g j yT 1] . (18)
Let UT (yT 1) = E [uT (yT ) j yT 1] denote her expected utility if she does not have the car. Note that the
value of having the car, UT (yT 1; L)  UT (yt 1) is increasing in yT 1 and decreasing in L.
Proceeding recursively, suppose we have identied Ut+1(yt; L) and U t+1(yt) and that the value of having
the car entering time t+ 1, Ut+1(yt; L) U t+1(yt) is increasing in yt and decreasing in L. Consider the con-
sumer at time t 2 f1; :::; Tg. If she does not own the car, she consumes her income yt, realizing utility ut (yt),
so her expected present value just prior to the realization of yt is U t (yt 1) = E

ut (yt) + U t+1 (yt) j yt 1

.
If she owns the car, she optimally repays if
vt + ut (yt  m (L)) + Ut+1 (yt; L)  ut (yt) + U t+1 (yt) . (19)
Under our induction hypothesis, she optimally repays if yt is above some threshold yt (L), with the threshold
increasing in L. Let Ut (yt 1; L) denote the consumers present value just prior to the realization of yt,
assuming she still has the car. It follows that Ut (yt; L)  U (yt) is increasing in yt and decreasing in L.
This argument yields a complete characterization of repayment behavior in terms of the re-payment
thresholds y1 (L) ; ::::; y

T (L). A consumer who owns the car at date t makes payments if and only if yt 
yt (L). The length of repayment S is a random variable equal to maxft : yk  yk (L) for all k  tg. The
theoretical model does not pin down a functional form for its distribution, which depends on the income
process, the consumption value of the car over time, and consumer preferences. In our empirical model, we
assume that the distribution of s = S=T is truncated log-normal. As we showed earlier, this assumption
appears to t the empirical distribution of repayment lengths well. The model does imply that an increase
in loan size, by increasing every payment threshold, shortens the time to default. This feature is borne out
in our estimates.
12Throughout this example we assume that the only uncertainty pertains to an individuals future income.
It would be fairly straightforward to allow for uncertainty about future preferences or the consumption value
of the car.
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Now consider the consumers down payment decision at t = 0 assuming she decides to purchase the car.
If her current income is y0, her optimal down payment solves:
max
D
v0 + u0 (y0  D) + U1 (y0; p D) . (20)
Let D (y0) denote the optimal down payment. If the consumer chooses to purchase, and faces a minimum
down payment d, her constrained optimal down payment will be D (y0) = minfd;D (y0)g. Note that in
choosing the down payment, an increase in y0 has two e¤ects: it reduces the need for cash but also increases
expected future income. The former e¤ect makes a higher down payment desirable; the latter e¤ect has an
ambiguous e¤ect on the desired down payment. We make the assumption that D (y0) (and hence D (y0))
is increasing in y0.
Finally, we turn to the consumers decision of whether or not to purchase the car. Purchasing is optimal
if and only if:
max
Dd
v0 + u0 (y0  D) + U1 (y0; p D)  u0 (y0) + U1 (y0) . (21)
Not surprisingly, a lower car price p or minimum down payment d makes purchasing more attractive. Holding
the o¤er terms xed, purchasing is optimal if and only if initial income y0 is above some threshold level y0 .
Recall that our empirical model collapsed the borrowing and purchasing decisions. To do this, it is useful
to re-state the optimal purchasing rule to say that the consumer purchases if and only if D (y0) is above
some threshold d, where d = D (y0). This involves no loss of generality so long as D
 (y0) is increasing in
y0. We can then dene Z (d) = d d to match the notation of the theoretical model to that of the empirical
model.
Just as our theoretical model does not imply a functional form for the distribution of repayment times, it
also does not imply a functional form for distribution of the ideal down payment D, which depends on the
distribution of y0 and other parameters of the model. In our empirical estimation, we assume that D has a
normal distribution, so that the actual distribution of down payments has a truncated normal distribution.
As we showed earlier, this assumption seems to align quite well with the empirical distribution of down
payments we observe in the data.
Appendix B: Specication and estimation of the recovery value
This appendix describes the recovery model used to estimate expected recovery amounts conditional on
default. The recovery model is estimated separately from the purchase and repayment model, and the
recovery parameter estimates are taken as given when computing expected net revenues in supply side
estimation and counterfactuals. The recovery model consists of two separate equations. The rst equation
is a probit regression with a positive recovery indicator as the dependent variable, estimated using all loans
that end in default.
The second equation is a linear regression with recovery amount as the dependent variable, estimated
using all observations with positive recoveries. Both equations use the same set of explanatory variables,
which include car characteristics, applicant characteristics, time and city xed e¤ects, and the number of
months that loan payments were made before default. The last variable is of particular importance, since it
provides a link between recovery amount and the endogenous loan repayment variable si. Credit category
xed e¤ects are not included in either recovery equation since they are found to have very little explanatory
power. Estimating the recovery equations separately from the main model essentially assumes that the
residuals in the recovery model are independent of the other unobservables in the model.
Table A1 shows the parameter estimates from both recovery equations. The results are fairly intuitive.
An increase in the number of months before default decreases the probability of a non-zero recovery and
also decreases the expected recovery amount, conditional on a non-zero recovery, by about $45 per month.
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Individual characteristics, such as higher monthly income, possession of a bank account, and home ownership,
do not have a signicant e¤ect on the probability of recovery, but do signicantly increase the expected
recovery amount, conditional on recovery occurring.
Appendix C: Derivations and estimation details
C.1 Derivation of Likelihood Function for Demand
In this section we derive the likelihood function used to estimate the parameters of the price negotiation
equation, the purchase and nancing equation, and the loan repayment equation. We begin with the three
equations:
pi = li + x
0
i+ i (22)
Di = x
0
ix + pip + "i (23)
ln(si ) = x
0
ix + (pi  Di) L + i. (24)
The variables pi (negotiated price), Di (desired down payment), ln(s

i ) (log of fraction of payments made),
and Di (observed down payment - a nonlinear function of Di ) are the systems endogenous variables, and
li (list price) and xi (a vector of o¤er, car, applicant, location, and time characteristics common to all
equations) are considered exogenous. The variables Di and ln(s

i ) are latent variables that are not observed
for all applicants; specically, Di is not observed if applicants either make the required minimum down
payment or do not purchase at all, and ln(si ) is not observed if loan repayment is censored either due to
full payment or the end of our sample. We discuss the relationship between these latent variables and their
observable counterparts, Di and ln(si), in more detail below.
The unobservables i, "i, and i are distributed jointly normal as:0@ i"i
i
1A  f(i; "i; i) = N (0; V ) with V =
0@ 2 "" "" 2" ""
 "" 
2

1A : (25)
This joint density provides the foundation for deriving the likelihood function of the data L(pi; Di; ln(si)jdi; li; xi).
We begin by rewriting the joint density
f(i; "i; i) = f(iji; "i)f("iji)f(i); (26)
where f(i) = N(0; 2), f("iji) = N("j ; 2"j) with "j = "" i and 2"j = 2"(1   2"), and
f(ij"i;i) = N(j;"; 2j;") with
j;" =
 
 ""
 2 ""
"" 
2
"
 1
i
"i

; (27)
and
2j;" = 
2
  
 
 ""
 2 ""
"" 
2
"
 1

""

: (28)
Since the Jacobian of the transformation of (i; "i; i)
0 to (pi; Di ; ln(s

i ))
0 is 1, we can write the joint
density of (pi; Di ; ln(s

i ))
0as:
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f(pi; D

i ; ln(s

i )jli; xi) = f(ln(si )  x0ix   (pi  Di) Ljpi   li   x0i;Di   x0ix   pip) (29)
f(Di   x0ix   pipjpi   li   x0i)
f(pi   li   x0i):
If Di and ln(s

i ) were observed for all applicants, this expression would provide the likelihood function for
the data; however, since Di and ln(s

i ) are not always observed, we must rewrite this expression in terms of
the observable Di and ln(si). We proceed in four steps. First, we derive the likelihood of observing a given
negotiated price. Since we assume price is observed for all applicants (we impute prices for non-buyers),
this step is straightforward. The probability of observing a negotiated price pi is given simply by
ppi = 

pi   li   x0i


(30)
where  denotes the standard normal pdf. We do not account for censoring at list price, since this would
require integration over i for some observations, thus complicating the derivation of the likelihood function
with limited added benet.
Second, conditional on a negotiated price, we derive the likelihood of observing three possible purchase
and nancing outcomes: sale with a down payment above the minimum, sale with a minimum down payment,
and no sale. We dene the observed down payment Di as:
Di =
8<:
Di = x
0
ix + pip + "i if D

i  di
di if Di 2 [di   Zi; di)
? if Di < di   Zi
(31)
where Zi = di + x0ix + pip + did, and "i is correlated with i. The rst case applies applicants who
purchase a car and make a down payment above the minimum, the second to applicants who purchase a car
and make a minimum down payment, and the third to applicants who do not purchase. In the rst case,
Di is observed, and the likelihood is dened by the pdf of "i. In the latter two cases, D

i is unobserved, and
the likelihood of each outcome is dened by the corresponding cdf. To incorporate the correlation between
"i and a known i, we calculate the probability of each outcome conditional on i.
The probability of observing a sale with a given down payment above the minimum is:
p
Di=D

i
ji
= Pr(Di = x
0
ix + pip + "i j i) = 

Di   x0ix   pip   "j
"j

(32)
We can write this expression in terms of the standard normal pdf since "iji  N("j ; 2"j) implies that
conditional on i, ("i   "j)=2"j  N(0; 1).
The probability of observing a sale with a minimum down payments is:
p
Di=diji
= Pr(Di 2 [di   Zi; di) j i) (33)
= Pr(di   Zi   x0ix   pip < "i < di   x0ix   pip j i)
= 

di   x0ix   pip   "j
"j

  

di   Zi   x0ix   pip   "j
"j

where  denotes the standard normal cdf. For certain parameter values, Zi, may be negative, meaning
p
Di=di
= 0, though in practice, this occurs for less than 0.1 percent of observations.
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The probability of observing no sale is:
p
Di=?ji
= Pr(Di < di   Zi j i) = Pr("i < di   Zi   x0ix   pip j i) (34)
= 

di   Zi   x0i   pip   "j
"j

The third step is to derive the likelihood of observing three possible loan repayment outcomes: no
payments, default after at least one payment, and payments censored due to full payment or the end of our
sample, conditional on a negotiated price and a purchase and nancing decision. We begin with the model
in equation (9), but adapt it to account for loans that are censored by the end of our sample period. We the
dene the censoring point, ci 2 (0; 1] as the fraction of the loan observed in our data. The observed fraction
of payments made, si, is then
si =

si = exp(x
0
ix + (pi  Di) L + i) if si < ci
ci if si  ci ; (35)
where i is correlated with i and "i. The rst case applies to buyers with observed default (including
default after zero payments), and the second applies to buyers with censored repayment. For loans that
have been repaid in full, ci = 1. To account for the correlation between i and (i; "i), we calculate the
probability of each repayment outcome conditional on (i; "i). As shown below, when "i is unobserved (that
is, when a minimum down payment is made), this requires integration over "i.
With "i known, the likelihood of observing censored payments is:
p
si=ciji;"i
= Pr(si = ciji; "i) = Pr(si  ciji; "i) = Pr(exp(x0ix + (pi  Di) L + i)  ciji; "i) = (36)
= Pr(i <   ln(ci) + x0ix + (pi  Di) Lji; "i) = 
  ln(ci) + x0ix + (pi  Di) L + j;"
j;"

The likelihood of observing no payments is:
p
si=0ji;"i
= Pr(si = 0ji; "i) = Pr(si < gji; "i) = Pr(exp(x0ix + (pi  Di) L + i) < gj"i) = (37)
= Pr(i < ln(g)  x0ix   (pi  Di) Lji; "i) = 

ln(g)  x0ix   (pi  Di) L   j;"
j;"

;
where g represents the fraction of the loan paid in each installment. The probability of zero payments thus
equals the probability of default before the rst payment is made.
The likelihood of observing payments through si prior to the censoring point is:
p
si=s

i
ji;"i
= Pr(si = s

i ji; "i) = (38)
= 

ln(si + g)  x0ix   (pi  Di) L   j;"
j;"

  

ln(si )  x0ix   (pi  Di) L   j;"
j;"

The conditional moments in these expressions, j;" and j;", are functions of i and "i. We can
calculate i as pi   li   x0i for all buyers. When a down payment above the minimum is observed, we can
calculate "i as Di   x0ix   pip, which yields a likelihood for each repayment outcome written in terms of
the observed Di . However, when a minimum down payment is observed, or when "i is unknown, we must
integrate over all "i in the minimum down payment region. After replacing "i = Di  x0ix pip, this yields
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the following likelihood for each repayment outcome:
p
si=0jpi;Di=di
=
Z di
di Zi


ln(g)  x0ix   (pi  Di) L   j;"(Di )
j;"



Di   x0ix   pip
"j

dDi (39)
p
si=cijpi;Di=di
=
Z di
di Zi

  ln(ci) + x0ix + (pi  Di) L + j;"(Di )
j;"



Di   x0ix   pip
"j

dDi (40)
p
si=s

i
jpi;Di=di
=
Z di
di Zi
0@  h ln(si+g) x0ix (pi Di)L j;"j;" i 
 
h
ln(si ) x0ix (pi Di)L j;"
j;"
i 1A Di   x0ix   pip
"j

dDi (41)
The nal step is to combine the set of negotiate price probabilities ppi , purchase and down payment
probabilities (p
Di=?jpi
, p
Di=dijpi
, and p
Di=D

i
jpi
) and loan repayment probabilities (p
si=0jpi;Di
, p
si=cijpi;Di
, and
p
si=s

i
jpi;Di
) into a full likelihood function for data, L(pi; Di; ln(si)jdi; li; xi). Before writing the full likelihood
function, it is useful to dene the set of possible outcomes observed in the data:
 I0: no sale
 I1: sale, down payment above minimum, no payments
 I2: sale, down payment above minimum, censored payments
 I3: sale, down payment above minimum, observed default after at least one payment
 I4: sale, minimum down payment, no payments
 I5: sale, minimum down payment, censored payments
 I6: sale, minimum down payment, observed default after at least one payment
Using the notation i 2 I to indicate that applicant i chose outcome I, we can write the full log-likelihood
function for the data as:
logL =
X
i
log(p
pi
) +
X
i2I0
log(p
Di=?jpi
) + (42)
+
X
i2I1
flog(p
Di=D

i
jpi
) + log(p
si=0jpi;Di=Di
)g+
X
i2I4
flog(p
Di=dijpi
) + log(p
si=0jpi;Di=di
)g+
+
X
i2I2
flog(p
Di=D

i
jpi
) + log(p
si=cijpi;Di=Di
)g+
X
i2I5
flog(p
Di=dijpi
) + log(p
si=cijpi;Di=di
)g+
+
X
i2I3
flog(p
Di=D

i
jpi
) + log(p
si=s

i
jpi;Di=Di
)g+
X
i2I6
flog(p
Di=dijpi
) + log(p
si=s

i
jpi;Di=di
)g
Our estimates of the parameters ; x; p; x; p; d; x; L; "; ; ";  ; "; and  maximize this log-
likelihood function.
C.2 Supply Side Estimation
In this section we derive the moment conditions used to estimate the supply-side parameter  . We rst
derive detailed expressions for net revenue, ri, expected net revenue conditional on sale, Ri, and expected
prots, i, and describe how these quantities are computed in practice. We then derive a set of moment
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conditions from the rms optimal pricing problem and describe the method used to estimate supply-side
parameters.
When the number of payments made, Si, is known, net revenue is given by equation (13):
ri = Di + (pi  Di)
1

 
1  e Si
1
zi
(1  e ziTi) + e
 Siki   Ci: (43)
When Si is unknown but "i is known, we can integrate over Si to calculate expected net revenues
conditional on "i. Replacing Si = siTi in the above expression, and integrating over si instead of Si,
expected net revenue conditional on "i is:
E[rij"i] = psi=0j"iE[rijsi = 0] + psi=1j"iE[rijsi = 1] +
Z 1
0
p
si=s

i
j"i
E[rijsi = si ]dsi = (44)
= p
si=0j"i
(Di + ki   Ci) + psi=1j"i (Di + (pi  Di)
1

 
1  e Ti
1
zi
(1  e ziTi)   Ci) +
+
Z 1
0
p
si=s

i
j"i
(Di + (pi  Di)
1

 
1  e si Ti
1
zi
(1  e ziTi) + e
 si Tiki   Ci)dsi
where p
si=0j"i
, p
si=s

i
j"i
, and p
si=1j"i
are dened above. The rst term on the right hand side of the equation
is equal to the probability of zero payments times the net revenue from zero payments, the second term is
equal to the probability of full payment times the net revenue from full payment, and the third term is equal
to the expected net revenue from between 1 and Ti   1 payments.
This expression for expected revenue can be used when "i is known, or alternatively when Di has been
observed by the rm. To compute the expected net revenue conditional on sale prior to observing Di , we
integrate over the region of sale, namely the region where "i > di   Zi   x0ix   pip:
Ri = E[rijgi  0] =
Z 1
di Zi x0ix pip
E[rij"i]

"i
"

d"i =
Z 1
di Zi
E[rijDi ]

Di   x0ix   pip
"

dDi (45)
where the second equality follows by replacing "i = Di   x0ix   pip.
Expected prots are then equal to the probability of sale times the expected revenue conditional on sale,
or:
i = QiRi = (1  pDi=?)E[rijgi  0] =

1  

di   Zi   x0i   pip
"

E[rijgi  0]: (46)
For our current estimation, we assume thatZ
 (l(x); d(x);x; !) dF (x; !) 
Z
 (l(x) + a; d(x) + b;x; !) dF (x; !) for all a; b 2 R: (47)
We approximate the integral by using its empirical analog, summing over the observed applicants. To
operationalize the optimality assumption, and because the rm prefers to o¤er prices on discrete intervals
(e.g. minimum down payments and margins are typically in units of $100), we do not compute the rst order
conditions, but rather we compute the expected prots that could be gained from increasing or decreasing
contract terms by $100. If the rm is pricing optimally, these potential gains should be non-positive.
Our current procedure computes the gains from these possible deviations and searches for the supply side
parameter  that make the observed pricing optimal. Specically, we search for  that minimizes the two
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equations below:

d[di; pij ] =
"
min
(
0;
X
i
(i(di; pi) i(di + 100; pi))
)#2
+
"
min
(
0;
X
i
(i(di; pi) i(di   100; pi))
)#2
(48)
and

p[di; pij ] =
"
min
(
0;
X
i
(i(di; pi) i(di; pi + 100))
)#2
+
"
min
(
0;
X
i
(i(di; pi) i(di; pi   100))
)#2
(49)
The parameters are found by grid search over a grid with increments of $100 for the rms shadow cost of
capital adjustment  .
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Figure 4(c) : Distribution of Default Timing Conditional on Default
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Figure 6(a): Effect of Price-Cost Margin Changes
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Notes: Based on model estimates for all applicants. The x-axis represents the target margin (list price minus cost) for applicants in each
risk category. The left-hand y-axis represents the probabability of sale (for applicants) and probability of default (for buyers). The right-
hand y-axis represents expected profit per applicant, calculated as the probability of sale times net operating revenue per sale, where net
operating revenue = down payment + PV of loan payments + PV of recovery - vehicle cost - unobserved cost. The unobserved cost is
estimated using the supply-side moments described in Section 5. Diamonds show observed average price-cost margins for each credit
category. Stars show optimal price-cost margins based on model estimates.
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Figure 7(a): Average Down Payments and Default Rates without 
Minimum Down Payment Requirements 
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Notes: This figure shows expected average down payments and default rates for borrowers in each of six credit categories, labeled C1 (least risky) to 
C6 (most risky) in the absence of minimum down payment requirements. Bubble sizes indicate the number of loans made to borrowers in each credit 
category.  Average down payments, default rates, and numbers of loans are calculated based on our estimated demand model , assuming borrowers in 
each credit category have characteristics equal to those of the mean borrower in the sample. The figure shows that in the absence of minimum down 
requirements, the market exhibits adverse selection in the sense that riskier borrowers are more likely to borrow and choose lower down payments.
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Figure 7(b): Minimum Down Requirements Increase Average Down 
Payments and Decrease Riskier Borrowers' Demand for Loans
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Notes: This figure shows how average down payments and the number of loans made to borrowers in each category change with the introduction of 
minimum down payment requirements. As in Figure 7(a), bubble sizes indicate the number of loans made to borrowers in each credit category, and 
average down payments and numbers of loans are calculated based on our estimated demand model. Default rates are those that  would occur without 
minimum down requirements. The figure shows that observed minimum down payment requirements mitigate adverse selection in two ways: 
descreasing the number of high risk borrowers and increasing the average down payments of these borrowers.
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Figure 7(c): Minimum Down Requirements Also Reduce Default Rates 
Through Improved Screening and Smaller Loan Sizes
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Notes: This figure shows how default rates for borrowers in each category change with the introduction of minimum down payment requirements. As in 
Figure 7(a), bubble sizes indicate the number of loans made to borrowers in each credit category, and average down payments, default rates and 
numbers of loans are calculated based on our estimated demand model. The figure shows observed minimum down requirements reduce default rates 
relative to the case in which minimum down requirements are absent. This occurs for two reasons: first, borrowers who are able to meet the minimum 
down requirement are positively selected in the sense that they are more likely to repay, and second, borrowers on average have smaller loans.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Obs* Mean Std. Dev. 5% 95%
Applicant Characteristics
Age N 32.8 10.7 19 53
Monthly Income N 2,414 1,074 1,299 4,500
Home Owner N 0.15 - - -
Live With Parents N 0.18 - - -
Bank Account N 0.72 - - -
Risk Category 0.34 - - -
Low N 0.27 - - -
Medium N 0.45 - - -
High N 0.29 - - -
Car Purchased N 0.34 - - -
Buyer Characteristics
Age 0.34N 34.7 10.8 20 55
Monthly Income 0.34N 2,557 1,089 1,385 4,677
Home Owner 0.34N 0.17 - - -
Live With Parents 0.34N 0.16 - - -
Bank Account 0.34N 0.76 - - -
Risk Category
Low 0.34N 0.35 - - -
Medium 0.34N 0.47 - - -
High 0.34N 0.17 - - -
Car Characteristics
   Acquisition Cost 0.34N 5,090 1,329 3,140 7,075
   Total Cost 0.34N 6,096 1,372 4,096 8,212
   Car Age (years) 0.34N 4.3 1.9 2.0 8.0
   Odometer 0.34N 68,775 22,091 31,179 102,299
   Lot Age (days) 0.34N 33 44 1 122
   Car Price 0.34N 10,777 1,797 8,095 13,595
Transaction Characteristics
   Min. Down Payment (applicants) N 648 276 400 1,200
   Min. Down Payment (buyers) 0.34N 750 335 400 1,400
   Interest Rate (APR) 0.34N 26.2 4.4 17.7 29.9
   Loan Term (months) 0.34N 40.5 3.7 35.0 45.0
   Down Payment 0.34N 942 599 400 2,000
   Loan Amount 0.34N 10,740 1,801 7,982 13,559
   Monthly Payment 0.34N 395 49 314 471
Loan Outcomes (uncensored sales only)
   Default 0.13N 0.61 - - -
   Fraction of Payments Made 0.13N 0.58 0.38 0.04 1.00
   Loan Payments 0.13N 7,972 5,635 491 16,587
   Nonzero Recovery (all defaults) 0.08N 0.78 - - -
   PV of Recovery (all recoveries) 0.06N 1,579 1,328 231 4,075
   Gross Operating Revenue 0.13N 9,614 5,192 2,169 17,501
   Net Operating Revenue 0.13N 3,333 5,020 -3,906 10,284
Notes: * To preserve the confidentiality of the company that provided the data, we do not report the exact number of
applications. Loan Payments, Gross Operating Revenues, and Net Operating Revenues are in present value terms.
Gross Operating Revenue = Down Payment + PV of Loan Payments + PV of Recovery. Net Operating Revenue = Gross
Operating Revenue - Total Car Cost including sales tax.
Table 2: Model Fit
Raw Data Demand Model
Close Rate
All Applicants 0.343 0.343
Low Risk 0.451 0.451
Medium Risk 0.398 0.398
High Risk 0.249 0.249
Probability of Making Minimum 
Down Payment
All Buyers 0.431 0.430
Low Risk 0.234 0.234
Medium Risk 0.428 0.428
High Risk 0.570 0.570
Average Loan Size
All Buyers $10,709 $10,690
Low Risk $11,047 $11,034
Medium Risk $10,660 $10,649
High Risk $9,992 $9,967
Probability of Payment
All Buyers 0.390 0.397
Low Risk 0.559 0.559
Medium Risk 0.363 0.384
High Risk 0.289 0.320
Fraction of Payments Made
All Buyers 0.594 0.612
Low Risk 0.715 0.764
Medium Risk 0.576 0.596
High Risk 0.521 0.560
Correlation between Loan Size and 
Fraction of Payments Made
All Buyers -0.056 -0.055
Low Risk -0.013 -0.078
Medium Risk -0.064 -0.049
High Risk -0.142 -0.111
Notes: Close rate, probability of making minimum down payment, and average loan amount
based on all observations. Probability of making minimum down payment is conditional on
sale. Probability of payment, fraction of payments made, and correlation between loan size
and fraction of payments made based on uncensored sales only.
Table 3(a): Demand Estimates
Dependent Variable Probability of Sale Down Payment Payments Made
Marg. Eff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Offer Variables
  Minimum Down ($1000s) -0.219 (0.012) - - - -
   Negotiated Price ($1000s) -0.002 (0.019) 0.091 (0.061) - -
   Maximum Interest Rate (%) 0.002 (0.001) 0.007 (0.0006) -0.032 (0.0003)
   Term (years) -0.066 (0.019) -0.199 (0.024) -0.196 (0.068)
   Loan Amount ($1000s) - - - - -0.187 (0.011)
Car Characteristics
   Car Cost ($1000s) 0.030 (0.019) 0.085 (0.005) 0.200 (0.011)
   Premium (Cost > $7,500) 0.062 (0.008) 0.196 (0.004) 0.109 (0.007)
   Car Age (years) 0.004 (0.002) 0.005 (0.011) -0.043 (0.012)
   Odometer (10,000s) -0.002 (0.002) -0.006 (0.007) 0.002 (0.013)
   Lot Age (months) -0.004 (0.004) -0.018 (0.003) -0.047 (0.008)
Individual Characteristics
   Income ($1,000s/month) 0.019 (0.003) 0.053 (0.004) 0.073 (0.010)
   Age 0.007 (0.001) 0.014 (0.011) 0.012 (0.036)
   Age squared -2E-05 (1E-05) -1E-04 (2E-04) -1E-04 (4E-04)
   Bank Account 0.029 (0.004) 0.092 (0.020) 0.228 (0.036)
   House Owner -0.022 (0.006) -0.068 (0.061) -0.004 (0.102)
   Lives with Parents 0.008 (0.006) 0.025 (0.046) -0.108 (0.101)
Credit Category Fixed Effects
   Low Risk 0.093 (0.016) 0.276 (0.042) 0.887 (0.080)
   Medium Risk 0.099 (0.014) 0.289 (0.030) 0.340 (0.086)
   High Risk 0.050 (0.010) 0.147 (0.037) 0.007 (0.047)
Seasonal Effects
   Tax Season 0.173 (0.012) 0.504 (0.038) 0.089 (0.093)
Other Fixed Effects Year, Month, City, Credit Category
Covariance Matrix Nu Epsilon Eta
   Nu (price equation) 0.284 (0.004) -0.027 (0.031) -0.004 (0.005)
   Epsilon (purchase equation) -0.027 (0.031) 1.008 (0.028) 0.155 (0.024)
   Eta (payment equation) -0.004 (0.005) 0.155 (0.024) 2.235 (0.039)
Notes: All estimates based on demand model described in Section 4 and Appendix C.1. The sample for the purchase and down
payment equations is a random sample of all applicants; the sample size is 0.10N, where N >> 50,000 (see Table 1). The sample for
the fraction of payments made equation is all sales; sample size is ~0.034N. Reported estimates in the first colunm show the marginal
effects of a one unit change in each of the explanatoryvariables on the probability of sale. Estimates in the second column show the
effects of a one unit change in each explanatoryvariable on desired down payment (in $1,000s). For instance, a $1,000 increase in
price raises the desired down payment of the average applicant by $91. Estimates in the third column show the effects of a one unit
change in each explantoryvariableon the log of fraction of payments made. For example,a $1,000 increase in loan amount decreases
the fraction of payments made by 18.7 percent.  Standard errors are bootstrap standard errors from 30 resamplings.
Table 3(b): Supply Estimates
Level Changesa Percent Changesb
Unobs. 
Cost Std. Err.
Unobs. 
Cost Std. Err.
Uniform
   Baseline 2,400 (84) 2,300 (90)
   Learning #1 2,700 (527) - -
   Learning #2 2,500 (493) - -
   Learning #3 2,900 (580) - -
   Learning #4 2,600 (542) - -
By Credit Category - Broad
Low Risk 3,300 (130) 3,200 (152)
Medium Risk 2,200 (101) 2,300 (119)
High Risk 1,700 (107) 1,800 (127)
By Credit Category - Fine
1 (lowest risk) 4,200 (272) 4,600 (2688)
2 3,800 (254) 3,800 (260)
3 2,800 (168) 2,700 (200)
4 2,300 (118) 2,300 (133)
5 2,200 (183) 2,300 (194)
6 1,800 (166) 1,800 (176)
7 1,500 (275) 1,700 (239)
8 (highest risk) 1,900 (241) 1,900 (220)
Seasonal
   Non Tax Season 2,400 (81) 2,300 (101)
   Tax Season 2,200 (258) 2,100 (402)
Notes: All results are estimates of the firm's shadow cost of capital adjustment based on the supply-
side moment inequalities described in Section 5 and Appendix C.2. Estimates assume a firm
discount rate of 10 percent.  Standard errors are bootstrap standard errors from 30 resamplings.
The two columns correspond to alternative methods of computing moment inequalities, specifically:
a Moment inequalities are based on $100 uniform changes to minimum down and price.
b Moment inequalities are based on 10% changes in minimum down and 1% changes in price.
The four estimates based on "learning" moment inequalities reflect the following four conditions:
#1: Period t+1 pricing dominates period t pricing in period t+1
#2: Period t+1 pricing dominates period t pricing in period t+1 (weighted by apps)
#3: Period t+1 pricing dominates period t pricing in period t
#4: Period t+1 pricing dominates period t pricing in period t (weighted by apps)
Table 4: First Order Condition Quantities by Risk Category
All Sales
Description Representation in Paper Low Risk Med Risk High Risk All Buyers
Close Rate Q(pi, di) 0.451 0.398 0.249 0.343
Profit Conditional on Sale
Average Buyer E[r(pi, di) | gi > 0] $2,137 $969 $348 $1,174
Marginal Buyer E[r(pi, di) | gi = 0] $1,719 $481 -$117 $609
Average Non-Buyer E[r(pi, di) | gi < 0] $1,036 -$252 -$745 -$226
Changes in Close Rates
$100 increase in minimum down Q(pi, di) - Q(pi, di + 100) -0.023 -0.026 -0.020 -0.022
$1,000 increase in list price Q(pi, di) - Q(pi + 1000, di) -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
Changes in Profit Conditional on Sale
$100 increase in minimum down E[r(pi, di) - r(pi, di + 100) | gi>0] $11 $30 $43 $29
$1,000 increase in list price E[r(pi, di) - r(pi + 1000, di) | gi>0] $456 $223 $167 $267
Notes: All results based on model estimates at observed prices and minimum down payments. Close Rate is the probability that an applicant purchases a car. Profit
Conditional on Sale from the Average Buyer is expected profits from all applicants who purchase a car. Profit from the Marginal Buyer is the expected profit from all buyers
whose desired down payments are between $0 and $100 above the purchase threshold. Profit from the Average Non-Buyer is the expected profit from applicants who do not
purchase a car, assuming these applicants make the minimum down payment. Profit is defined as net operating revenue (down payment + PV of loan payments + PV of
recovery - vehicle cost) minus a shadow cost. The shadow cost is estimated using the supply-side moments described in Section 5. Increases in price and minimum down
payment describe uniform changes across all credit categories and time periods.
Table 5(a): Value of Credit Scoring
Low Risk Med Risk High Risk All Applicants
Minimum Down Payment
Observed pricing $400 $600 $1,000 -
Optimal credit-based pricing $0 $700 $1,550 -
Optimal uniform pricing $800 $800 $800 $800
Pricing with perfect knowledge of liquidity - - - -
Close Rate
Observed pricing 0.451 0.398 0.249 0.343
Optimal credit-based pricing 0.568 0.377 0.150 0.340
Optimal uniform pricing 0.381 0.352 0.291 0.328
Pricing with perfect knowledge of liquidity 0.577 0.472 0.273 0.408
Profit Conditional on Sale
Observed pricing $2,137 $969 $348 $1,174
Optimal credit-based pricing $1,924 $1,026 $914 $1,258
Optimal uniform pricing $2,254 $1,092 $218 $1,112
Pricing with perfect knowledge of liquidity $2,499 $1,543 $1,154 $1,695
Expected Profit per Applicant
Observed pricing $963 $385 $87 $402
Optimal credit-based pricing $1,093 $387 $137 $428
Optimal uniform pricing $859 $384 $63 $364
Pricing with perfect knowledge of liquidity $1,443 $728 $314 $692
Notes: All results based on model estimates. Close Rate is the probability that an applicant purchases a car. Profit Conditional on
Sale is defined as net operating revenue (down payment + PV of loan payments + PV of recovery - vehicle cost) minus a shadow
cost. The shadow cost is estimated using the supply-side moments described in Section 5. For observed pricing, profit conditional
on sale corresponds to the term E[r(pi, di) | gi > 0] in Table 4. Expected profit per applicant is equal to the close rate times profit
conditional on sale.  
Each counterfactual represents a different minimum down payment policy. List prices are held fixed at observed values in all
counterfactuals. (1) Observed pricing describes outcomes based on the company's observed minimum down payments, which vary
both over time and across credit categories. (2) Optimal credit-basd pricing describes a counterfactual in which minimum down
payments are constant over time, but vary by credit category in order to maximize expected profit per applicant. (3) Optimal uniform
pricing describes a counterfactual in which a single minimum down payment, which is constant over time and across credit
categories, is chosen to maximize expected profit per applicant. (4) Pricing with perfect knowledge of liquidity describes a
counterfactual in which the firm sets a minimum down payment for each applicant equal to the maximum amount that the applicant is
able to put down, and only sells to applicants who are profitable at this minimum down payment. 
Table 5(b): Value of Tax Season Pricing
Low Risk Med Risk High Risk All Applicants
Minimum Down Payment
Observed Tax-Season Pricing $400 $600 $1,000 -
Optimal Tax-Season Pricing $50 $1,300 $1,900 -
Optimal Full-Year Pricing $0 $700 $1,550 -
Close Rate
Observed Tax-Season Pricing 0.506 0.463 0.288 0.402
Optimal Tax-Season Pricing 0.615 0.368 0.172 0.350
Optimal Full-Year Pricing 0.615 0.466 0.220 0.417
Profit Conditional on Sale
Observed Tax-Season Pricing $2,040 $929 $396 $1,085
Optimal Tax-Season Pricing $1,818 $1,313 $1,114 $1,429
Optimal Full-Year Pricing $1,812 $944 $815 $1,121
Expected Profit per Applicant
Observed Tax-Season Pricing $1,033 $431 $114 $436
Optimal Tax-Season Pricing $1,118 $483 $192 $500
Optimal Full-Year Pricing $1,114 $440 $179 $468
Notes: All results based on model estimates for tax season only. Tax season is defined as the month of February. Close Rate is the
probability that an applicant purchases a car. Profit Conditional on Sale is defined as net operating revenue (down payment + PV of
loan payments + PV of recovery - vehicle cost) minus a shadow cost. The shadow cost is estimated using the supply-side moments
described in Section 5.  Expected profit per applicant is equal to the close rate times profit conditional on sale.
Each counterfactual represents a different minimum down payment policy, and each allows minimum down paymentes to vary by
grade. List prices are held fixed at observed values in all counterfactuals. Observed pricing describes outcomes based on the
company's observed minimum down payments during tax seasons. In this scenario, minimum downs may vary across different tax
seasons. Optimal tax-season pricing describes a counterfactual in which minimum down payments are chosen to maximize expected
profit per applicant during tax seasons. Optimal full-year pricing describes a counterfactual in which minimum down payments are
chosen to maximize expected profit per applicant over the entire sample. 
Table 5(c): Credit Scoring as a Barrier to Entry
(Incumbent Profit per Applicant, Entrant Profit per Applicant)
Incumbent Prices 
Uniformly
Incumbent Prices 
by Risk Category
No Entrant (Monopoly) ($364, $0) ($428, $0)
Entrant Prices Uniformly ($168, $168) ($249, $123)
Entrant Prices by Grade ($123, $249) ($202, $202)
Equilibrium Minimum Downs
Uniform
By Risk Category
(Low, Med, High)
Monopoly $800 $0, $700, $1550
Vs. Uniform $350 $0, $450, $750
Vs. Risk-Based $500 $0, $250, $1000
Notes: All results based on model estimates. Each cell in the first panel of the table
presents the expectedprofits per applicant for an incumbent lender (first) and the profits per
applicant for a potential entrant (second), calculated at the equilibrium minimum down
payments shown in the corresponding cell of the second panel.  
The top row presents the case of no entrant, which is also presented in Table 5(a). The
second row presents the case where an entrant prices uniformly (i.e. sets one minimum
down for all risk categories), and the third row represents the case where an entrant prices
by risk category.  Each column represents the pricing strategy of the incumbent firm.
In each scenario, we find the Nash Equilibrium of the duopoly game in which each of the
firms simultaneously either set uniform or risk-based minimum down payments. We
assume that applicants who choose to put down more than either firm's minimum down
payment are randomly split between the two firms, and other applicants choose the lender
with the lowest minimum down payment. We also assume that car prices remain the same
in all scenarios. Expected profits conditionalon sale are then calculated using the estimated
repayment equation (Table 3(a), column 3) and estimated costs (Table 3(b)).
Table A1: Recovery Parameter Estimates
Dependent Variable Nonzero recovery ind. Recovery Amt ($1000s)
Probit OLS
dF/dx Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Months Paid -0.006 (0.0002) -0.045 (0.001)
Car Characteristics
   Car Cost ($1000s) 0.027 (0.002) 0.526 (0.006)
   Premium (Cost > $7,500) -0.097 (0.008) 0.079 (0.024)
   Car Age (years) -0.008 (0.001) -0.068 (0.004)
   Odometer (10,000s) 0.010 (0.001) -0.029 (0.003)
   Lot Age (months) -0.004 (0.001) -0.131 (0.004)
Individual  Characteristics
   Income ($1,000s/month) 0.000 (0.002) 0.048 (0.006)
   Bank Account 0.001 (0.003) 0.078 (0.012)
   House Owner 0.001 (0.004) 0.118 (0.015)
Other Fixed Effects Year, Month, City, Year, Month, City,
Notes: The sample for the probit equation is all defaults; sample size is ~0.18N, where N >> 50,0000 (see
Table 1). Reportedcoefficients show the marginal effect of a one unit change in the explanatoryvariableon the
probability of making a positive recovery. The sample for the OLS equation is all recoveries; sample size is
~0.14N.
